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Abstract
This paper presents findings from a study of the codesign of business processes and IT systems at the
enterprise level. The findings suggest a punctuated
equilibrium model of boundary-spanning design that
is driven by a series of coordinating representations of
the design problem-structure. These become more
complicated as the design proceeds, adding new
perspectives and dimensions to prior representations,
and calling upon salient surface-structures that are
helpful in conceptualizing the context of design. This
finding challenges the notion of design as the
exploration of deep organizational structures or as
goal-driven design.

1. Introduction
Change projects involving the design of
enterprise-spanning information systems (IS) create
special problems for change managers as they
combine the problems of spanning multiple domains
or organizational practice – each of which has its own
culture, values, and practices - with those of balancing
business process change requirements with
requirements for computer-based information systems
design. While we may theorize boundary-spanning
systems design as “the constant shaping of
‘sociotechnical systems’ in the form of design
requirements that are attentive to and reflect the
emerging interactions among people, software, and
technologies,” [1], this description fails to explain how
we should approach boundary-spanning IS design in
practice.

2. Conceptual underpinnings
Boundary-spanning design involves coordinated
sensemaking across a variety of stakeholders and
participants, each of whom interprets organizational
problems and solutions according to their role in an
intersecting set of participation frameworks – the
professional practices, socio-cultural values and
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norms that govern work in various organizational
knowledge domains [2]. Organizational IS design may
be understood as an emergent change process,
achieved through the gradual realignment of
information systems to fit with emerging business
strategy in response to changes in its operating
imperatives and external business environmental [3].
IS design may alternately be conceptualized as a
process of punctuated equilibrium, defined as periods
when stable organizational structures constrain radical
change, punctuated by brief transitions that introduce
disruption and upheaval to the status quo [4]. Drawing
on paleobiology, punctuated equilibrium relies on the
idea that complex organizational systems are
stabilized by some underlying order, or “deep
structure” [5, 6]. Deep structure in organizations
reflects political centers of power, socio-cultural
practices and values, control-systems, and technology
configurations [6]. It is difficult to change deep
structure because of the trail of strategic choices create
a “sunk cost” imperative to justify the existing
organization [4]. Deep structure reflects the mutual
reinforcement that results from ongoing organizational
enactment [7]. “The deep structure is what confines
change during equilibrium periods to variations on an
enduring theme – and it is also what ‘disassembles,
reconfigures, and enforces wholesale transformation
during revolutionary punctuations’” [4].
Organizational participants interact with its deep
structure through a “surface structure”, a set of
features and interfaces provided by organizational
information systems. These provide generative
configuration mechanisms for organizational and IS
design [5]. So we may conceptualize IS change as
“complex, multi-level, episodic change where
simultaneous processes interact creating unpredictable
and dynamic change outcomes” [8, p.592]. The
generative change needed for Enterprise System
design may come about because of a continuous
adjustment, as the surface structure provided by the
system is seen as misaligned with strategic change
imperatives – for example, the need for company vs.
competitor sales reporting in response to increased
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competition in the marketplace. Or it may result from
a series of episodes and transitions, which advance the
design or reveal areas where the deep structures of
organization been poorly understood [8]. The first
research question thus explores the design process:
RQ1: What process model best describe boundaryspanning, information system design in the wild – and
how does this operate?
To understand how deep and surface structures
are understood by IS design participants, I employ the
epistemological lens of social cognition, where
individuals employ cognitive frames or mental models
that reflect their experiential knowledge (a.k.a.
technological frames, when these are applied to group
perceptions of the role, use, or impact of technology)
[3]. Sensemaking in boundary-spanning collaboration
is effected through the use of epistemic objects, such
as design models and specifications that allow
understanding to be explored through representation
[9] and boundary objects that allow knowledge
specific to one participation framework to be
translated across domain-boundaries without design
participants needing to understand every aspect of the
participation framework of others [10]. A multi-level
analysis is required as individual framing of design
requirements may align or conflict with
intersubjective (shared by the design group) frames,
which may in turn be different than generically
subjective frames that reflect group or organizational
consensus (“what we all know”) [3, 7, 11]. “Organized
sensemaking” occurs as actors collaborate on
interpreting organizational structures and the changes
required to make these work for the situation at hand.
Groups of change agents jointly construct design
frames through three stages of distributed
sensemaking: (i) enactment, where participants
perform a course of action that creates or reinforces
organizational
structures,
(ii)
selection
of
organizational narratives used to interpret the
situation, and (iii) retention where frames that align
with group perspectives are operationalized into
methods for future design [7]. The second research
question thus explores distributed sensemaking:
RQ2: What is the process by which design team
participants collaborate in framing, exploring, and
agreeing design problems and solutions?

3. Research site and method
3.1. Research site
The ethnographic study presented here explores
the organizing and framing processes of a group of
strategic senior managers engaged in the definition of
financial and enterprise systems in a U.S. University,

over a period of two years. The University is a private,
4-year degree granting institution, well regarded in its
region. It offers a wide variety of majors in Business,
Communication Studies, Education, Fine &
Performing Arts, Healthcare & Sports Sciences,
Humanities, Social Sciences & Psychology, Natural
Sciences, and Pre-Med. The University employed an
Enterprise System that was used by many similar
academic institutions, but which had not been fully
implemented. Several functional groups, in particular
Human Resources, were suspicious of the introduction
of an overarching administration system, viewing this
as an attempt to impose control over their group
culture and existing practices.
The Design Taskforce was assembled in response
to a perception that the University’s Enterprise
Systems (ES) were inadequate for financial
management and reporting. Taskforce participants
included all of the major organizational managers: the
Dean of Academic Affairs, the Executive Director of
Student Accounts, Director of the Office of Student
Accounts, the University Registrar, and Associate
Registrar, the Dean of Finance & Operations, the
Director of Financial Aid, the Financial Systems
Manager, the Coordinator of Special Projects for the
University, the Director of Marketing, and the Director
of Information Services. Ad hoc participation was
invited from all actors and groups affected by the
current area of operational focus and included a senior
system analyst whose role was to formalize design
requirements for changes to the Enterprise System.
Taskforce members were involved in a collective
process of Enterprise System redesign that had
recently started when I was invited to join the team for
the research study. They met monthly, to discuss
issues and to define what requirements needed to be
resolved by members before the next meeting.

3.2. Research method
I employed a participant observation approach to
ethnography, over a period of two years. Initially, I
observed and recorded meetings of the Enterprise
Systems Taskforce, to acculturate myself to the
content and context of the change initiative. I attended
monthly meetings of the Taskforce, interviewed the
regular participants to understand how they
understood and defined project objectives, and what
problems they perceived with defining a joint design.
After the first two meetings, I met with participants
again to map out the processes that they perceived
should be managed by the Enterprise System. I
explored the key decision-points where boundaryspanning coordination was required across domains.
These were used to suggest issues for discussion in
group meetings. I interacted regularly with meeting
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participants, discussing their analysis and activities
between meetings, and reviewing progress with the
Information Services Manager, who led the design
initiative. During episode 6, I facilitated a systemic
analysis workshop with the Taskforce, using Soft
Systems Methodology (SSM) techniques to map
suggested system solutions and employing a systemic
problem
analysis
to
explore
problem
interdependencies between workgroups [2]. The
workshop involved the main participants and a number
of influential decision-makers including the
University President, in processes of problem
surfacing and exploration. These were effective at
achieving a shared perspective and resulted in a
cohesive, shared model of the change goals, moving
forward. Following that point, I attended meetings as
an ethnographic observer until the Enterprise System
change requirements were defined and implemented.

strategic planning was influenced too much by
opportunities offered by community interest groups
and international non-government organizations
(NGOs). This was seen to lead to many of the other
problems listed. Taskforce members tried – and failed
– to define a cohesive set of processes and a supporting
Information System that would resolve these issues
without overly constraining the flexibility to serve
local community organizations with rigorous degree
programs that were tailored to their needs – a strategic
University goal. The disruptions that led to agreement
that the Enterprise System needed to be updated to
support program creation and student enrollment more
effectively was the realization that the program
creation guidelines and program evaluation processes
were not being used. Executive decision-makers did
not plan new program designs around the credit
requirements for students to qualify for Financial Aid,
recruiters ignored enrollment deadline constraints in
4. Findings
order to maximize their rewards (they were paid for
the number of students recruited), and Admissions
4.1. Framing change goals
staff enrolled students at the last minute to ensure the
The main issue facing the Taskforce was how to
financial viability of a new academic program. This
manage the introduction of new degree programs.
led to the creation of a new ES Taskforce, to explore
There was a wide variation in how participants defined
what changes needed to be made to the enterprise
the problem, shown in Table 1. The only point of
system in order to formalize, control, and coordinate
agreement across Taskforce members was that
program creation, admissions, and student enrollment.
Table 1. Problem-Frames of Key Taskforce Stakeholders
Stakeholder
Information Services
Group

Problem framing
a strategic
management issue

University Registrar
& Admissions Mgr.
Dean of Finance
Financial Aid
Administrators

administrative
issue
an admissions
management issue
a strategic
management issue

Manager of Student
Support Services

administrative
issue

Director of
Information Services

logistical
management issue

Nature of problem
because strategic management is entrepreneurial, new programs are
announced before the various administrative groups have time to evaluate
the implications or prepare for program administration
students are often recruited to programs for which no classroom location,
instructor, or facilities are available
students are recruited at the last minute in order to ensure the program’s
financial viability, so there was a high degree of uncertainty about class sizes
because strategic management is entrepreneurial, degree programs are
scheduled at the last minute – these fail to meet financial aid eligibility
requirements (e.g., the number of instruction weeks in specific academic year)
Recruiters promise students that they will be eligible for financial aid, even
when this has not been confirmed – the University needs to meet any
shortfall in funding
programs include textbooks and computers in tuition costs, but there is
insufficient time for these to be ordered

4.2. Coordinating shared task goals
The process-timeline for introducing a new
program, shown in Figure 1, provided a coordinating
object for the group design. This took the form of an
abstract “script” to explore the work of various
operational groups around a standardized calendar.
The loose alignment provided by the timeline allowed
members of each workgroup to attach their own
information needs and procedures to the timeline
without it conflicting with individual perspectives.

Figure 1. New Program Process Timeline
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Table 2. Coordinating Objects Used By Key Stakeholder Groups
Stakeholder Group
Information
services group
University registrar
Financial Aid Group
Financial
Controller’s Office
Information
Technology

Key Issue(s)
Coordinating rapidly changing information about
student and program arrangements that the
Enterprise System cannot manage
ensuring that students are registered in time for
the degree start
processing and validating financial aid
applications prior to registration
ensuring that the new program is economically
viable in advance of its start
Requirements analysis for changes to the
Enterprise System

The process of agreeing which information needs
would be met by the Enterprise System was
contentious, with many group’s requirements being
rejected by the Information Services Manager as “not
related to program creation.” Disruption to the group
consensus introduced by this standardized Process
Timeline arose when the model was proposed to
faculty committees for use. Feedback from faculty
demonstrated that the standardized timeline only
“worked” to coordinate business processes because it
excluded enterprise system workarounds employed by
each group involved in implementing new programs.
Various groups employed a local spreadsheet of
student-status to track rapidly-changing information
that the Enterprise System could not provide. This was
updated with additional information by each group and
maintained locally, so it contained inconsistent status
indicators across the various groups using this
information, as shown in Table 2. When the IT analyst
collecting ES change requirements could not reconcile
various workgroup versions of the spreadsheet, the
Taskforce realized that they needed to formalize the
information used to plan new academic programs.

4.3. Defining shared program categories
A Taskforce workshop was held to explore how
the “big picture” of program administration was
coordinated across all affected stakeholder groups.
Each group framed a number of special cases and

Purpose of shared student status spreadsheet
Order printed materials & reserve rooms for
classes in advance of formal registration
Update status as students complete each stage
of application and registration
Check student eligibility for financial aid
Anticipate class size
Attempting to codify spreadsheet info. fields
to define system functionality

multiple disagreements arose around which should be
accepted as legitimate procedures. The aggregated set
of special cases complicated the flowchart so much
that no-one could understand the process flows. In a
subsequent brainstorm session, Taskforce members
brainstormed how to categorize the special cases.
They converged on a solution of standardizing the
format of new academic programs, by type. Taskforce
members identified four different types of program
calendar: Semester Programs, Certificate Programs,
Quarter Programs, and Ad Hoc Programs. A new
University Calendar, shown in Figure 2, was defined
around these program formats. Start-date ranges for
each type of program were defined and all activities
required before a program could start were mapped
out, to define the lead time required for program
introduction and design for each category. The student
accounts and financial aid groups were especially
active in this episode, leading discussions about
standardization needs and explaining their information
requirements in great detail. When the standardized
calendar was introduced, it appeared to have an
immediate effect. Operations to coordinate work
between groups were simplified. Student aid issues
were reduced. The longer planning lead times were
perceived as producing higher quality academic
programs. But as the administrative year proceeded,
there appeared to be an increasing number of
exceptions to these program formats. New exceptions
were defined to accommodate legacy programs, or to
meet the needs of specific community programs.

Figure 2. The Process Timeline (Calendar) For New Program Lead-Time, By Category
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The disruption to this episode of coordination
around a standardized program format occurred
because of increasing tensions between the regulating
influence of the “standardized” program formats and
the way in which new program requirements evolved
to fulfill the community support aspects of the
University mission. Many new programs did not
conform to a standardized format and there was
increasing dissatisfaction from strategic planners that
University strategy was being impeded. Both the
Executive Committee and the University President
were pushing for an expansion of the University’s
strategic plan to take advantage of opportunities
offered by private funding agencies and to expand
outreach to underserved areas of the U.S. This led to
rising tensions around how it could be accommodated.

4.4. Informal system boundary expansions
After a series of major disagreements, the
constraints of four standardized program formats were
rejected. New programs were created that did not
accord with these formats and that had shorter lead
times than required for effective planning. The various
groups represented on the Taskforce agreed that they
would implement contingency procedures to deal with
exceptions. Taskforce approval of these contingencies
expanded the business process boundary implicitly, by
adopting a series of contingency procedures defined
through short-term “interfaces” to external groups and
systems. The implications of this expanding
information system boundary were slow to be realized.
The increasing complexity of operations was obscured
by the information services group, who developed
short-term workarounds for each group. They made
phone calls to warn student services that action was
required, provided interim calculations of student
numbers to the registrar’s office, and fed student data
to the financial aid office for aid application
processing and to the financial controller’s office for
planning purposes. In effect the information services
group became a de facto coordination system,
operationalizing the implicit frames of various
Taskforce members to bypass the formal Enterprise
System and develop workarounds to formal business
processes based on the standardized calendar.
The eventual disruption occurred with the
realization that many new programs did not conform
to the credit or delivery requirements agreed with the
national accreditation board. The majority of new
programs needed last-minute changes to the
curriculum
to
conform
with
accreditation
requirements. When the group mapped out planning
procedures for new programs, they were shocked to
discover how much more complex these had grown

since the institution of the standardized program
calendars. It proved impossible to model a set of
standard procedures for the new programs. There were
so many special cases that the director of information
services observed that they were modeling “a calendar
per academic program.” The Financial Controller
became concerned that the true costs of each program
were not being accounted for and suggested they
attempt to standardize accounting for program costs.

4.5. A shared cost-reconciliation frame
The Taskforce decided that the calendar approach
to evaluating programs had introduced a false sense of
security. They adopted a standardized form of
program cost structure as their solution. The program
cost structure embodied a key concern - that programs
were being expanded without any analysis of the cost
implications – but it also provided a framework for
coordinated change. An activity-based analysis of
indirect program costs was performed by each group
involved. This revealed the shocking cost implications
of various types of program expansion. Various
Taskforce members volunteered to discuss cost
implications with individual Deans, with strategic
managers, and with other stakeholders, in order to
manage the political and organizational consequences
of standardization. An “informal cost structure” form
presented a new coordinating object for the group, as
various Taskforce members volunteered to investigate
the costs of time and resources spent on ad hoc
program workarounds. Taskforce members were
continually surprised by the totals reported as they
analyzed the detailed costs of their failure to
standardize the University calendar. These totals made
a huge impression on strategic managers - the
University President instructed the Taskforce to “take
control of the situation.” But it was clear that the key
problem lay with executive decision makers, who
continued to propose nonconforming, ad hoc
programs. The Taskforce could reach no conclusion
about how to deal with this.
Disruption to the cost-reconciliation frame came
with the news that accreditation was threatened by the
failure of recent academic programs to meet
accreditation requirements. The lack of conformity
with calendar credit requirements, national evaluation,
and quality criteria had led to pressure from a major
undergraduate program accreditation board. There
were several heated meetings, as Taskforce members
debated how to manage the situation and who should
take responsibility for change. In the end, the
University registrar took control of the situation and
met with the president to discuss how to manage the
situation.
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4.6. The power of external threats
The Taskforce received instructions from the
executive board to explore what needed to happen for
the University to standardize around a single program
calendar. Taskforce members now worked on a
universal set of procedures that would formalize
coordination across the various groups involved in
program administration. The external crisis instilled a
new sense of urgency and cooperation. Each
workgroup defined changes to the Enterprise System
that were required for coordination across domains.
For example, the financial aid office modeled the work
that they did, to justify their need for twelve weeks’
notice of individual student registrations prior to start
of the academic program year. The Student Services
group mapped out the multiple interactions between
their processes and student registration status, to
justify why they needed advance warning of student
enrollments. Even when changes were not agreed by
the Taskforce, they had established a much better
understanding of others’ work processes and this
assisted with negotiations. Standardized procedures
and templates were created rapidly for new program
planning, based on the Taskforce’s accrued learning.
A “will not be approved without this” framing
provided a motivating script for the framework!
Disruption to the strategic planning and
coordination frame came about when the introduction
of the standardized program approval framework
caused problems. Recruiters felt that they were being
cheated of the opportunity to recruit late students, and
compromises had to be made to keep them on board.
Executive decision makers had to be reminded of the
implications of abandoning the standardized calendar
and procedures whenever they attempted to do so
under pressure from community organizations to
provide open-access programs. There were ongoing
tensions between the needs of accreditation,
conformance, and the University mission to provide
open access to education.

4.7. Surfacing misunderstandings
Tensions between external threats and strategic
goals were resolved by the Information Services
director, whose group had devised the workarounds
that had previously caused so many problems. They
developed an informal cost estimation system (a
detailed spreadsheet) that reflected the activity-based
costs of introducing a new academic program, based
on estimates generated during cost-reconciliation.
Each time a new program was planned, the cost
estimation spreadsheet was used to reflect the true
costs of introduction. This exposed the costs of

deviations from the standardized calendar formats,
reducing these to almost nil. By disrupting the
strategic mission frame (“open access requires
responsive, ad hoc program creation”) with an adapted
version of the cost-reconciliation model, the
Information Services group was able to introduce a
collective breakdown that made the group realize that
they genuinely needed to formalize their “standardized
program approval” procedures by defining changes to
the Enterprise System design - which was why the
Taskforce had been assembled. These enabled the
Enterprise System to track formal program planning,
manage new program administration, and to support
the informal practices required for program planning
and student recruitment to work. The external
accreditation board was satisfied that the University’s
programs were now stable and well managed. Student
satisfaction also increased, as financial aid application
was simplified and became more certain. Not least, the
cost structure of programs was reduced drastically,
providing major benefits to the University and
allowing it to fulfill its mission more effectively.

4.8. Meta-analysis of design processes
The design project proceeded as a series of seven
episodes, described here and analyzed in Table 3.
Episode 1. The first coordinating object provided a
program proposal (document) template to provide a
“bare bones” outline of the information needed by
each group involved in the planning process. The
template proved inadequate, as it was often left
incomplete due to time constraints with submission.
Episode 2. A revised coordinating object employed a
timeline model to track the information requirements
of new program planning processes by lead-time. This
representation was selected to support the problemframe of ensuring that all groups had the requisite
information to plan their work in advance of new
program introduction. But it failed in practice, when it
was discovered that each group had a different version
of an interim student registration status spreadsheet,
that allowed them to contact or account for students in
advance of formal registration. The result was a
conflicting set student tracking requirements, which
were difficult for people from other workgroups to
reconcile. Many were dismissed as not necessary, only
to be reinserted when Taskforce members had a more
integrated appreciation of how the program planning
process needed to work across domains and time.
Episode 3. Failure to understand the Enterprise
System workarounds employed by each group led to
the adoption of another coordinating object, this time
representing the various categories of program
planning and attempting to develop the timeline
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calendar model of episode 2, to account for these
cases. The program categorization framework broke
down when it could not accommodate all of the special
cases needed for legacy programs, or emerging forms
of open access degree programs.
Episode 4. The program categorization framework
was replaced by an attempt to model and formalize
contingency procedures to deal with exceptions to the
standard program categories. The coordinating object
representation not only complicated the previous one,
but also incorporated a new coordination and control
mechanism, as contingency procedures were
controlled by the Information Services group to
centralize the coordination of new program planning.
This was undermined by the realization that the
centralized controls were creating even more work for
administrators, as the new programs did not conform
to accreditation requirements, triggering last-minute
revisions to their schedule and delivery plans and
increasing the cost of program creation.
Episode 5. The group complicated their problem
representation again, reframing the problem to capture
the cost of system and process workarounds and
compare it to an ordered planning process. The
resulting cost estimates shocked everyone – the cost of
workarounds increased new program costs
significantly. The cost-reconciliation process revealed
flaws in the assumptions underlying previous cost
estimation structures, leading to several programs
being abandoned before they were introduced. The
cost-basis problem-frame was disrupted in this
episode due to an external threat.
Episode 6. The failure of new programs to conform
with calendar credit requirements, national evaluation
standards, and quality criteria had led to pressure from
a major undergraduate program accreditation board to
standardize program schedule planning. This,
combined with the cost-structures uncovered during
reconciliation of the informal and formal activity-costs
during episode 5, led the Taskforce to return to a single
planning calendar and timeline. They extended this by
adding standardized processes to monitor and
coordinate planning with executive decision makers,
who were convinced of the need to conform to a
standardized program design by the external threat of
losing accreditation.
Episode 7. The recognition by executive decisionmakers of the need for control and standardization
permitted the planning processes to be formalized and
integrated into the enterprise system. By now, these
processes were well-understood across the various
stakeholders and knowledge domains involved, so IS
change requirements could be defined in detail from
the standardized process and information needs
defined in episode 6 and validated in episode 7.

5. Discussion of findings
5.1. Boundary-spanning design as punctuated
equilibrium
This section addresses [RQ1] What process model
best describe boundary-spanning, information system
design in the wild – and how does this operate? From
the summary in Table 3, the design process fits well
with a punctuated equilibrium model of system design,
organized around coordinating objects that reflected
an emergent understanding of the organization’s “deep
structures” [4, 6, 11]. The coordinating representations
and problem-frames employed in each episode
indicate an emergent understanding of design
objectives, scope, and deliverables, which was
mediated by attempts to model surface structures that
were salient to each episode of design [5]. The
literature views disruptive critical incidents as largely
resulting from external, environmental pressures [4, 6,
8, 12]. But, with one exception, the critical incidents
disrupting each episode of design were internal,
resulting from a misalignment of the surface structures
(represented by the coordinating objects created for
collective framing of the problem-space) with
organizational deep structures that were only partly
understood by each individual. Each episode’s
coordinating object model builds on the previous one,
to provide a successively more complex model of the
salient parts of the organization’s deep structure. The
“complication role” of coordinating objects allowed
them to coordinate group activity around a collective
and distributed form of experiential learning, as
various permutations of surface structure became the
subject of design-group experimentation cycles, as
shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Distributed Design Learning Cycle
The exception to the internal source of disruptive
critical incidents came when the University’s degree
accreditation was threatened. This created immediate
and radical disruption, that led to deep learning.
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Ep./Problem Frame
1. Coordinating
process
management

Table 3. Coordinating Objects Used By Key Stakeholder Groups

Coordinating object
Group Problematization
Business Process Changes System Impacts
New program proposal
Define templates, forms, Standardize program
Create informal
template constrains and and procedures for new
creation & student
guidelines; New forms &
procedures
regulates strategic
program creation and
recruitment procedures
Ensure student plan of
Eval. criteria defined for
management’s
implementation
entrepreneurial activity
study meets credit reqs.
Program Review Cttee
Disruption
Program proposal in complete: (i) Executive decision-makers do not ensure program of study will satisfy
accreditation/financial aid requirements before signing contracts; (ii) Recruiters ignore enrollment timeline
constraints: faculty, rooms, book, computer orders changed at last minute
2. Need to
Program proposal
Identify program
Coordinate info. flows:
Formal timeline does
constrain
timeline constrains
evaluation criteria:
Program goals & strategy not include student
entrepreneurial
improvisation in new
*Enrollment meets goals?  outreach  recruit
status info. required by
activity of
program design.
*Meets accreditation reqs.?  financial viability
various admin. groups.
strategic
It also coordinates
*Meets fin. aid credit reqs? Curriculum  accred. &
Attempts to formalize
*Student enrollment nos. fin. aid reqs.marketing student status fails, as
management and information flows
confirmed early enough to Recruit  admissions 
planners
between each group’s
too many variations
work processes.
arrange course logistics? registration  logistics
Disruption
Collective realization that timeline only works when it excludes detailed logic of workarounds employed by
each major domain group; Workarounds use student enrollment status spreadsheet defines lead-time
for key decisions; require intermediate student status reports
3. Agree shared
Program intro. processes Define start-date ranges
New program acceptance Managed by defining
prog. categorization modeled to integrate
when each program type criteria now include start- deadlines for review by
scheme that
info. from each group’s can meet accreditation & date and lead-time
various committees or
defines program informal work sheet; 4
financial aid reqs. to define constraints for each of 4 admin. groups.
calendars
program types defined
each program’s lead-time program types.
Disruption
Program categorization framework breaks down when it cannot accommodate the special cases needed
for many legacy programs, or the emerging needs of new community degree programs driven by University
strategy of expanding open access to education
4. Implement
Info. Services Group
What do we need to do, to The formal system of
Info. Services group
contingency
communicates student
ensure program conforms work-activity is expanded becomes de facto
procedures to
enrollment & status
to accreditation, financial through short-term
coordination system,
deal with
changes to admissions,
aid requirements?
“interfaces” to external bypassing Enterprise Sys
How do we assess
Informal system: emails
exceptions to
student services,
groups and systems to
program financial viability? accommodate non& phone calls used for
standard program registrar, financial aid,
categories
and financial controller
conforming programs
calendar workarounds
Disruption
New programs do not conform to credit/delivery requirements agreed with accreditation board, need to
be updated before introduction. Taskforce cannot integrate all special cases into standard calendar or cost
model (need to model “a calendar per academic program”).
5. Employing a cost Standardized costWhat are workaround
Taskforce members
Informal cost structure
reconciliation
structure provides a
costs for new programs? investigate costs of time replaces direct cost
approach through framework to explore
How much time/effort
and resources spent on structure in strategic
an “informal cost info. & activity reqs. for does each group spend to ad hoc programs.
decision making, to
structure” form
new program. Activityperform ad hoc work
Financial controller
account for real costs of
based cost analysis
calculates total costs of new program
needed to ensure
accounts for indirect and programs are financially
program planning
introduction – total costs
direct program costs
and academically viable? revealing estimate flaws shock everyone!
Disruption
EXTERNAL THREAT: The failure of new programs to conform with calendar credit requirements, national
evaluation, and quality criteria leads to pressure from a major undergraduate program accreditation board
to fix programs, or lose accreditation status.
6. Explore what
Strategic planning and
Taskforce explores how
Taskforce maps out
Formal procedures
needs to happen coordination around a
workflows in one group
universal procedures &
are codified to the
for University to single academic calendar, create or resolve
lead-times to coordinate extent that these can
standardize
with two variations
problems in other groups, formal and informal work be incorporated into
program mgt.
(semester and quarter)
resurrects ill-understood involved across groups to the formal Enterprise
around a single
and a uniform start week problem frames rejected create, evaluate, &
System
calendar
for all programs
in earlier design episodes manage a new program
Disruption
Standardized program approval framework causes problems: Recruiters feel they are cheated of
opportunity to recruit late students. Executive decision makers are under pressure from ext. community
organizations to provide non-conforming, open-access programs and need to be monitored carefully.
7. Coordinating
Mandatory standardized Is proposed new program Direct & indirect costs of Enterprise System
program
procedures & templates
financially and
new program intro.
integrates standard
planning across
created for new programs academically viable, if we estimated using activity- procedures &
workgroups via
and courses.
include the indirect costs framework from ep. 5.
templates. Informal
Lead-times for planning cost estimate now used
standardized
Without conformance to and lead-times needed
incorporated from prior to predict financial
procedures.
these, programs will not
for workarounds to
be approved.
standard calendar?
process mapping
viability of program.
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Because this misalignment threatened the core of
the organization’s deep structure (its ability to award
degrees), resources at all levels were mobilized and the
Taskforce was able to define new processes and
standards very rapidly. One might argue that the rapid
response resulted from the generative design enacted
in previous episodes of distributed, experiential
learning. Taskforce members had internalized the
operation of the deep structures needed to coordinate
business and information processes across domain
boundaries, which allowed them to react quickly in a
crisis. The difference in the magnitude of change and
the rapidity of response might explain why major
critical incidents are viewed as resulting mainly from
external pressures [4,6,8,12]

5.2 Multiple layers of framing interaction
This section explores [RQ2] What is the process
by which design team participants collaborate in
framing, exploring, and agreeing design problems and
solutions? The coordinated, distributed cognition
observed here operated at three levels of analysis:
A “primary generator” model. Darke, in her studies
of architectural design noted the organizing power
exercised by an abstraction of the expected solutionstructure, which she termed the “primary generator” of
design. For example, architects might agree that they
were designing a ranch house. This provided a
framework to coordinate the work that followed [13].
The generative framework was provided in this study
by agreeing a collective objective of mapping out the
processes of new academic program creation. Even
though group models and individual requirements for
these processes changed throughout the design,
Taskforce members used their process model to define
how administrative work was coordinated across
organizational domains, permitting a division of
design labor that was retained throughout the project.
The primary generator framework appeared to mediate
knowledge translations across the boundaries of each
admin. group’s participation framework, by placing
interactions within a known situation and sequence, so
the design group could contextualize who-knows-what
and who-does-what.
Coordinating objects or representations. A series of
coordinating objects, discussed above, reflected the
current problem frame for each episode. Each
coordinating object incorporated the problemstructures of the previous one, complicating the
structure to reflect an emergent design scope and
boundary. These structures therefore appeared to play
the role of epistemic objects [13], creating emergent
models of reality that allowed misalignments with the
deep structures of organization to be realized.
Individual
problem-frames.
Individuals
surfaced implicit frames that represented requirements

for an IS solution frequently in design meetings. It
soon became clear that these often conflicted with the
group’s shared understanding of the problemsituation. Debate around application of the current
coordinating object exposed misalignments between
internalized deep structures - understood only in part
by individuals - and the surface structures represented
in the fragmented requirements for a design solution
that the group produced, resulting in breakdowns.
A breakdown [15] occurs when our habitual
practice – our seamless “being in the world” – is
interrupted by the need to reflect on why things did not
work as expected. “Breakdowns serve an extremely
important cognitive function, revealing to us the
nature of our practices and equipment, making them
‘present-to-hand’ to us” [14, pp. 77-78]. The deep
structures of a problem-situation are revealed only
when we stop to puzzle over why a process or tool did
not produce the expected outcome. While a
breakdown is generally conceptualized as a cognitive
(individual) phenomenon, the interaction effects seen
here suggest that a collective breakdown results when
design group participants simultaneously realize that
their shared understanding is insufficient to
incorporate all of their implicit requirements for a
solution. At this point, they coordinate argumentation
around an epistemic object that allows them to explore
their concerns [9] while presenting a sufficiently
abstract boundary object [10] that it can coordinate
knowledge across the network of interlocking
participation frameworks represented by design group
members [2]. When disagreements reach a critical
mass, such that group consensus around the
coordinating object can no longer be relied upon, the
coordinating object is complexified to incorporate a
wider range of concerns, while still being defined at a
sufficiently vague level of abstraction that it can
operate as a boundary object to mediate domainspecific participation frameworks [10]. Each
coordinating object thus creates an expanded space for
learning about the problem-structure that allows
design participants to translate observed actions into
the new systems of activity required [5].
The model of punctuated equilibrium that results
is shown in Figure 4, demonstrating how three distinct
levels of collective understanding interact to support
the processes of boundary-spanning design. Collective
breakdowns occur when a critical mass of dissonance
forms around the coordinating object. Table 3 reveals
that the realization of critical levels of dissonance is
triggered by managerial reviews that expose
operational problems in the design or by external
threats to the organization. The subsequent process of
reframing the problem-space is productive for design,
as it complexifies the emergent group understanding
through the distributed experiential learning shown in
Figure 3 and the interaction effects shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Layers of Framing in Complex Design

6. Conclusions

7. References

The contribution of this study is to present a
model and detailed explanation of how boundaryspanning, complex systems design proceeds through a
process of punctuated equilibrium. While interaction
effects between individual, group, and generically
subjective levels were noted by Drazin et al. [11] in
their study of organizational innovation, this study
presents exposes interactions between multiple levels
of cognition within a network of interlocking
participation frameworks [2]. The role of surface
structures as providing an interface to deep structures
via Information Systems design has been noted in the
design science literature [5]. These findings suggests
that the individual framing of surface structures that
occurs when implicit IS solution requirements are
surfaced, plays a key role in collective learning, as
these misalign with collective representations of
organizational deep structures (coordinating objects).
The collective breakdowns that ensue act productively
by refocusing design attention on a more complex
representation of the problem-space, that increases
shared understanding of the design problem.
The implications for research are that we need to
explore interaction effects between collective and
individual design-framing in more detail, to
understand how a design group’s network of
interlocking participation frameworks enables
emergent, individual framing of (solution-space) IS
requirements, in particular what indicates design
closure. The implications for practice are that we
might productively employ a spiral process model for
IS design that intentionally triggers a collective
breakdown in each iteration. In boundary-spanning
design contexts, we need to move the emphasis from
goal-driven design to problem-focused exploration, as
requirements for the IS solution appear to “fall out of”
process-iterations that build to provide a sufficiently
complex definition of deep structures in the problemspace for the design group to construct a complex,
systemic solution.
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